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Abstract
Within the EU, the so-called “refugee crisis” has been predominantly dealt with as an ill-timed and untenable financial
burden. Since the 2007–08 financial crisis, the overarching objective of policy initiatives by EU-governments has been to
keep public expenditure firmly under control. Thus, Sweden’s decision to grant permanent residence to all Syrians seeking
asylum in 2013 seemed to represent a paradigmatic exception, pointing to the possibility of combining a humanitarian ap-
proach in the “long summer ofmigration”with generouswelfare provisions. At the end of 2015, however, Sweden reversed
its asylum policy, reducing its intake of refugees to the EU-mandated minimum. The main political parties embraced the
mainstream view that an open-door refugee policy is not only detrimental to the welfare state, but could possibly trigger
a “system breakdown”. In this article, we challenge this widely accepted narrative by arguing that the sustainability of the
Swedish welfare state has not been undermined by refugee migration but rather by the Swedish government’s unbending
adherence to austerity politics. Austerity politics have weakened the Swedish welfare state’s socially integrative functions
and prevented the implementation of a more ambitious growth agenda, harvesting a potentially dynamic interplay of ex-
pansionary economic policies and a humanitarian asylum policy.
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1. Introduction
Sweden experienced an immediate drop in GDP growth
during 2008 and 2009 in the aftermath of the global
financial crisis, but fully recovered from the downturn
more quickly than other EU countries without endan-
gering public finances as well as managing to keep the
government debt-to-GDP ratio at a comparatively low
level of about 40 percent (Erixon, 2015; Stenfors, 2016).
The Swedish government’s handling of the crisis was
unanimously praised by international financial institu-
tions and the country came to be held up as some sort
of role model for the other EU member-states. Due to
its favourable economic and financial situation, together
with its strong tradition of refugee protection dating as
far back as the early-1970s, Sweden conveyed the im-
pression of being the best-equipped EU country to cope
with the “long summer of migration” in 2015 (Kasparek
& Speer, 2015); a period that came to be known by the
Euro-centric label “the refugee crisis”.
By September 2013, Sweden had become the first
country in the world to offer permanent residency to
all Syrians seeking asylum. One year after, in August
2014, Fredrik Reinfeldt, the centre-right former prime
minister, called on Swedes to “open…[their] hearts to
people fleeing under great stress” (Rosén, 2014). In the
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same speech, however, Reinfeldt presaged that the un-
precedented humanitarian effort could pose a major
challenge for the financial sustainability of the welfare
state. Therefore, he appealed to the population to ac-
cept, “patiently”, the increase in social expenditure re-
sulting from the expected rise in refugeemigration, allud-
ing to the need for compensatory spending cuts in other
policy areas.
In October 2015, in the context of a heated political
debate on Europe and Sweden’s so-called “refugee prob-
lem” and one year after Reinfeldt’s speech, the social
democratic Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, repre-
senting the newly elected red-green government, made
the argument for a sudden but inevitable U-turn in asy-
lum policy in a widely discussed interview with Swe-
den’s leading newspaper (Stenberg, 2015).Wallström im-
parted that refugee migration had reached an unsustain-
able level thatwas threatening to cause the “breakdown”
of the “system”. Thereafter, “system breakdown” (sys-
temkollaps in Swedish) came to be adopted as a trope
across the political spectrum, from the left to the right,
as well as in media debates, with 245 instances of this
phrase appearing in as many Swedish newspaper arti-
cles in November 2015, just a month after the interview
(source: Retriever Mediearkivet).
It was precisely that month that the announced
U-turn in asylum policy was implemented by the gov-
ernment led by the Social Democratic Prime Minister
Stefan Löfven. Refugee admissions were abruptly halted
and the maximum rate of refugee acceptance was re-
duced to the EU-imposed minimum quota. Document
checks were introduced at the border with Denmark
for the first time since the 1950s, while criminal sanc-
tions against smugglers (including activists moved by hu-
manitarian intentions) were toughened. Since 20 July
2016, permanent residence permits for refugees who
were not relocated to Sweden within the EU’s refugee
quota system were replaced with temporary residence
permits, and access to family reunification for recognised
refugees was drastically limited. Therefore, the only way
for non-relocated refugees to change their status from
temporary to permanent became that of obtaining fi-
nancial self-sufficiency through employment-related in-
come. The aim of this repressive package of regulations
was to make Sweden a less attractive destination for asy-
lum seekers and refugees. In this respect, the restrictions
proved to be effective as the number of asylum seek-
ers declined drastically from a peak of 156,460 in 2015
(equivalent to the largest per capita number of applica-
tions in any EU country) to 22,410 in 2016 (OECD, 2017).
The new legislation was presented as temporary in na-
ture and motivated by the exceptional circumstances of
the so-called “European refugee crisis”. In fact, the afore-
mentioned restrictions are planned to remain in force for
a three-year period until July 2019.
The policy U-turn marked a dramatic change in inter-
national and domestic perceptions of Sweden as a wel-
coming country for asylum seekers and refugees. The re-
alignment of Swedish asylum policy with that of the rest
of the EUmirrored the consolidation of a cross-party con-
sensus around the view of refugee migration as a poten-
tial threat for the Swedish welfare state, even in in the
context of the fast economic growth that the country
experienced after the 2007–08 global downturn (Erixon,
2015). Indeed, the risk of a trade-off between refugee
reception and the welfare state’s sustainability was first
evoked by Reinfeldt’s “open-your-hearts” speech, but
soon became deployed as an argument for justifying the
radical shift in asylum policy implemented by the red-
green government.
The aim of this article is to offer an alternative narra-
tive of the crisis of Sweden’s historically unique combina-
tion of universalistic social policy and inclusionary mul-
ticulturalism, which has been also labelled a “Swedish
exceptionalism” (Schierup & Ålund, 2011). For several
decades, the Swedish model’s crisis had been repeatedly
heralded as an imminent threat in both academic liter-
ature and domestic politics. Since the early 1990s, the
Swedish welfare state has undergone important transfor-
mations involving a stricter conditionality of access to,
and decreased generosity of, social security provisions
(Palme, Ferrarini, Sjöberg, & Nelson, 2012) together with
deregulation, privatisation and marketisation of nearly
all public services (Hartman, 2011; Svallfors & Tyllström,
2018). Furthermore, despite the comparatively low level
of income inequality, Sweden is the OECD country in
which inequality has grown the fastest in percentage
points since the mid-1980s (OECD, 2011). Yet, the hege-
monic rhetoric of an impending “systembreakdown” suc-
ceeded in obliterating over two decades of self-inflicted
neoliberal restructuring and, at the same time, in shifting
the blame onto, and therefore scapegoating, refugees
for allegedly threatening to plunge the vestiges of the
Swedish model into a crisis.
We argue for a reversal of this causality. Our argu-
ment is that that the sustainability of the Swedish model
has not been undermined by recent refugee migration
but rather by the Swedish government’s dogmatic adher-
ence to austerity politics. Austerity politics have weak-
ened the Swedishwelfare state’s socially integrative func-
tions and prevented the implementation of amore ambi-
tious growth agenda, harvesting a potentially dynamic in-
terplay of expansionary economic policies and a human-
itarian asylum policy.
In the following, we set out to address the relation-
ship between immigration and the welfare state, with a
specific focus on the recent Swedish debate surround-
ing the impact of refugee reception on public finances.
Our discussion is narrowed to the economic aspects of
refugee migration because this issue has had a major in-
fluence on the debate preceding the reform of asylum
policy in Sweden. Financial considerations have been
some of the underlying reasons for the reorientation of
Swedish asylum policy. However, this fact is rarely dis-
cussed in the literature, which mainly focuses on the
Swedish government’s anxiety over the growing xeno-
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phobic and welfare-chauvinistic sentiments in the pop-
ulation (e.g., Dahlstedt & Neergaard, 2016; Demker &
Van derMeiden, 2016; Norocel, 2016; Rydgren&Van der
Meiden, 2016). Thereafter, we go on to analyse policy de-
velopments in Sweden from the early-1990s onwards by
explaining how austerity politics steadily weakened the
effectiveness of the Swedish state-centred approach to
refugee integration. Our argument is that the conditions
for a “system breakdown” were not created by the in-
crease of refugee migration but rather by the Swedish
government’s unbending adherence to austerity politics.
In the conclusions, we discuss possible future develop-
ments of what remains of the Swedish model in the con-
text of the upcoming national elections scheduled for
September 2018.
2. Refugee Migration: Fiscal Cost or Dividend?
The hypothesis that international migration may have a
potentially detrimental effect on the welfare state of re-
ceiving countries has gained substantial influence in re-
search, particularly since the publication of awidely cited
study by Alesina and Glaeser (2004). These scholars con-
tended that roughly half of the differences in welfare
state spending between European countries and the US
could be explained by the decline in collective solidar-
ity associated with the ethno-racial “fractionalisation” of
the US population; i.e. its segmentation into groups dif-
fering in terms of language, religion or other cultural
markers. Alesina and Glaeser projected that European
countries would experience an analogous crisis of sol-
idarity as a response to increased international immi-
gration. They argued that immigration-induced diversity
would pave the way for the downsizing of European wel-
fare states.
The hypothesis that diversity has a negative effect
on the development of welfare states has been ques-
tioned primarily on historical grounds due to the differ-
ences between the ethno-racial history of the US and the
more recent immigration history of European countries
(Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). Another counter-argument
points to the institutional and political differences be-
tween theUS and European countries. For example,Mau
and Burkhardt (2009) demonstrated that ethnic diversity
does not necessarily translate into distributive conflicts
between groups if welfare states are institutionally de-
signed to prevent the emergence of such conflicts. An ad-
ditional factor to be taken into consideration is the polit-
ical context of reception countries. Hence, Taylor-Gooby
(2005) replicated the statistical analysis conducted by
Alesina and Glaeser, but adding a variable considering
the relative strength of the left parties in each country.
He found that this was the variable with the strongest
positive effect on welfare spending and that, when in-
cluded in the original statistical model, the negative ef-
fect of ethno-racial fractionalisation on welfare spending
lost its statistical significance. Therefore, he concluded
that “the presence of the left appears to be able to insu-
late welfare systems against the impact of greater diver-
sity among citizens” (Taylor-Gooby, 2005, p. 671).
The Swedish model has long been seen as a case
in point for the capacity of left political institutions to
counteract the expected negative impact of greater eth-
nic diversity on the welfare state. The Swedish model’s
unique combination of strongly redistributive social poli-
cies and a very liberal asylum policy has epitomised the
power of social-democratically inspired politics to hin-
der the potentially fractionalising effects of large-scale
immigration. In effect, the Swedish approach to refugee
integration and multiculturalism has been described as
state-centred; i.e., entailing a strong reliance on the po-
litically integrative functions of universalistic welfare in-
stitutions, encompassing the whole population and tran-
scending ethno-racial divisions (Borevi, 2017).
A more controversial issue is whether the Swedish
model has been able to yield gains from the public expen-
diture invested in promoting refugees’ integration into
the labour market or, conversely, whether refugees rep-
resent a mere burden for the welfare state. Two recent
studies based on Swedish register-data sought to esti-
mate the so-called “fiscal cost” of refugee reception in
the short- and long-term. The fiscal cost of refugee re-
ception is defined in these studies as the difference be-
tween the sum of the taxes and fees paid by refugees,
and the total costs of the transfers and services they re-
ceive from thewelfare state. Joakim Ruist (2015) showed
that refugees in Sweden are more likely than natives
to be economically dependent on income redistribution
policies. He estimated the fiscal cost of refugee migra-
tion at one percent of the Swedish GDP in 2007. This,
he argues, stems partly from refugees’ overrepresenta-
tion among welfare beneficiaries, but also from their
lower tax contributions associated with lower employ-
ment earnings. A study by Lina Aldén and Mats Ham-
marstedt (2016) focused on the cohorts of refugees who
fled to Sweden between 2005 and 2007, following them
longitudinally until 2012. The results from their analy-
ses showed that the average refugee had a fiscal cost
of about 200,000 Swedish kronor (about €20,000) in the
first year after immigration. This cost was cut in half after
seven years of domicile in Sweden. Assuming a continu-
ation of this trend, it would take 14 years before refugee
migration reaches the breakeven point; i.e., becomes a
net gain for public finances. Both studies indicate that al-
though refugee migration is far from putting the finan-
cial sustainability of the Swedish welfare state at risk,
it represents a substantial and prolonged burden. Yet,
despite the increasing academic and political popularity
of these analyses, the issue of the economic impact of
refugee migration on Swedish society is far from settled
in the literature.
In a recent article, political scientist Bo Rothstein
(2017) observed that in 2016 the Swedish economy grew
four times faster (in terms of GDP growth) than in other
Nordic countries. He contended that the previous year’s
large inflow of refugees was a key driver behind this
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growth. Specifically, the exceptional rate of economic
growth was fuelled by what he labelled as “involuntary
Keynesianism”, namely the fiscal stimulus effect asso-
ciated with the increase in public expenditure in the
Swedish public sector, and in local governments in par-
ticular, to sustain the public services needed to manage
the large-scale intake of refugees. It is a condition which
has also been dubbed “refugee Keynesianism” in the re-
cent Swedish and European debate (Hansen, 2017a).
The view that the high degree of immigration may
have a positive effect on the Swedish economy seems to
be confirmed by the work of Swedish economist Lennart
Erixon (2015). Erixon estimated that the increased labour
supply through refugee migration has contributed con-
siderably to the high GDP growth in Sweden in the after-
math of the 2007–08 crisis. At the same time, refugee
migration has resulted in a decrease in the share of the
working-age population for the total population. For this
reason, Swedish economic performance was less posi-
tive in terms GDP per-capita growth than in terms of to-
tal GDP growth for the period 2008–13. Per-capita GDP
growth was nevertheless higher in Sweden than in most
other European countries, including the other Nordic
countries (Erixon, 2015, p. 594).
Viewed from this alternative standpoint, the eco-
nomic contribution of refugee migration to the host
country’s economy does not seem to be adequately cap-
tured bymeasuring the difference between refugees’ tax
payments and the costs of what they receive in terms
of welfare benefits and services. This point has been
also raised by Philippe Legrain (2016) who criticised the
research design of studies focusing one-sidedly on the
alleged fiscal costs of refugee migration. For example,
Legrain observed that Ruist’s aforementioned study as-
sumed that public spending for certain public services
(e.g., defence and infrastructure) was higher for refugees
than for the rest of the Swedish population, without jus-
tifying this assumption. More importantly, Legrain ar-
gued that the fiscal accountability perspective used in
this kind of studies tends to underestimate the posi-
tive externalities—what he calls “dividends”—associated
with refugee reception. These dividends range from fu-
elling consumption demand in times of economic down-
turn to filling gaps in the labour market and reversing
demographic ageing trends in receiving countries. He
added that, in order to maximise the yield of these divi-
dends, receiving countries should develop and maintain
an adequate reception system and design integration
policies that effectively enhance the refugees’ potential
contribution to their host societies.
In this respect, research has shown that granting
permanent or temporary asylum has an influence on
refugee prospects for social integration into the host so-
cieties (Dustmann, Fasani, Frattini, Minale, & Schönberg,
2017). The acquisition of host country specific human
capital (e.g., proficiency in the local language and other
skills that are specific to the host country economy) is a
costly investment that may not give returns in the coun-
try of origin. Therefore, the returns for individual invest-
ments in human capital depend primarily on whether
refugees are given a clear perspective concerning their
future legal status in the host country, which in turn af-
fects their likelihood to stay or re-emigrate.
European governments, including Sweden, have re-
sponded to the refugee crisis by setting in motion po-
litical initiatives moving in the opposite direction; i.e.,
restricting asylum policies, shifting from permanent to
temporary residence permits and imposing limitations
on family reunification. These initiatives are typically pre-
sented as responses to the receiving population’s anx-
iety over rising immigration levels. In the case of Swe-
den, the U-turn in asylum policy has been interpreted as
an attempt to counteract the political discourse of, and
growing support for, the extreme right-wing party of the
Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna in Swedish)
(e.g., Demker & Van der Meiden, 2016). According to
the latest polls, this party would receive almost one fifth
of the votes if elections were to be held as this text
is written.
Another, and perhaps more tenable, explanation for
this EU-wide policy development has recently been pro-
vided by Peo Hansen (2017a), referring to the finan-
cial constraints imposed by the EU’s enduring austerity
regime. According to Hansen, the governments of EU
member states that decided for a rapid U-turn in their
asylum policy in the face of the upsurge in refugees such
as Sweden and Germany, did not fail to anticipate the
latent resentment of their populations towards immi-
grants. Rather, they failed to anticipate the structural in-
compatibility between a refugee policy aimed at yielding
long-term dividends and the EU-wide, short-sighted aus-
terity regime which imposes the achievement of perma-
nent budget surpluses to all member-states.
As explained in the next section, in the case of Swe-
den, the roots of this incompatibility between long-term
social integration goals and short-term austerity require-
ments neither emerged during the refugee crisis, nor as
a response to the Eurozone crisis that began at the end
of 2009. They can instead be traced back to the second
half of the 1990s when a series of policy changes led to
a “workfarist” reorientation of the Swedish welfare state
and the introduction of a new fiscal policy framework.
3. Austerity-Based Migration Policy in the Swedish
Consolidation State
At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden experienced a fi-
nancial crisis that had a wide-ranging, negative impact
on all sectors of the economy, as well as on society as a
whole, resulting in the deepest recession and the high-
est level of unemployment in the post-war period (Er-
ixon, 2015; Stenfors, 2016). That crisis and the policy
responses to it are generally recognised as key factors
that prompted, or at least accelerated, the retrenchment
of the Swedish welfare state (e.g., Haffert & Mehrtens,
2015; Streeck, 2017).
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In the mid-1990s, a newly installed social democratic
government undertook severe austerity measures, intro-
ducing a new fiscal framework that institutionalised the
prioritisation of balanced budgets and inflation control
over full employment, thus signalling a “clear break”with
the long-standing tradition of Keynesian-inspired policy
which had been dominant in the country since the 1930s
(Erixon, 2015, p. 569).
The introduction of the new fiscal framework re-
sulted in a radical transformation of the Swedish model.
According to Wolfgang Streeck (2017, p. 151), Sweden
ceased to be the forerunner of the social democratic wel-
fare regime to emerge as “[t]he most advanced case of
modern consolidation statewith a firmly established aus-
terity regime”. The notion of “consolidation state” was
proposed by Streeck (2014) as an antithesis to the Key-
nesian welfare state. It describes a political-economic
regime characterised by a rigid adherence to austerity
politics as a confidence-building strategy for retaining
the trust of financial markets, and thus attracting finan-
cial investments for refinancing public debt. In addition,
the consolidation state is typically based on a cross-party
consensus on the idea that balanced budgets should be
achieved primarily by reducing public expenditure rather
than by raising taxes.
Since the introduction of the new fiscal framework in
1997, the Swedish government has been forced to run a
budget surplus of one percent of GDP annually, and to
hold public expenditure below a three-year rolling ceil-
ing. The expenditure ceiling limits the room for expan-
sionary economic and welfare policies, but does not af-
fect revenues (Haffert & Mehrtens, 2015, p. 137). This
means that any budget surplus accrued through the year
can beused for reducing the tax burden, but any tax cut fi-
nanced by budget surpluses entails a corresponding drop
in public expenditure.
A consequence of the more restrictive fiscal policy
was the achievement of stable budget surpluses dur-
ing the 1998–2007 period, with the sole exception of a
small deficit in 2002 during the international downturn
associated with the dot-com bubble burst (Erixon, 2015,
p. 573). At the same time, Sweden experienced a 20-
percentage point decline in public expenditure between
1993 (the peak of the early-1990s crisis) and 2012, which
was accompanied by a parallel and slower but sustained
decline in public revenue by about ten percentage points
(Haffert & Mehrtens, 2015, p. 137). The achievement of
the targeted budget surpluses was essentially ensured
by a reduction in public expenditure that was faster than
that of public revenue, resulting in across-the-board cuts
affecting all areas of the welfare state.
The period after the early-1990s’ crisis saw the low-
ering of compensation rates for all income support mea-
sures, as well as a reduction in their coverage. A report
commissioned in 2012 by the Swedish parliament indi-
cated that the Swedish model had lost its international
primacy in terms of benefit generosity, concluding that
its previously renowned high levels of income protection
had to be considered “part of history” (Palme et al., 2012,
p. 30). The resulting decrease in redistributive impact of
the Swedish welfare state was a key driver of rising in-
come inequality as shown by the increase in the poverty
rate of non-employed individuals in receipt of welfare
benefits (Jonsson, Mood, & Bihagen, 2016).
Together with decreased benefit generosity and cov-
erage, labour market policy was reorientated from an ap-
proach with a strong focus on training and upskilling the
unemployed, to a more “workfarist” approach placing a
stronger emphasis on job search advice and monitoring,
including sanctions for non-compliance. A recent study
found that although expenditure on active measures is
still higher in Sweden than in other EU countries, the
share of participants in training programmes declined
to historically low levels after the 2007–08 crisis, while
those in subsidised employmentmeasures reached a his-
torical high (Bengtsson, Porte, & Jacobsson, 2017). The
two types of activation policy differ in that subsidised
employmentmeasures are typically less costly than train-
ing programmes, but the latter tend to be more effec-
tive from a long-term perspective; e.g., with regard to
the quality of the obtained employment and earnings lev-
els. The shift in activation policy can thus be seen “as a
response to a longer trajectory of running a budget sur-
plus and of fiscal consolidation policies” (Bengtsson et al.,
2017, p. 375).
The declining generosity of welfare benefits and the
cost-reducing reform of labour market policy negatively
affected the situation of foreign-born individuals in par-
ticular. Since the early-1990s, newly arrived immigrants,
and especially those with refugee status or family reuni-
fication as the grounds for residence permits, have had
lower employment rates and higher benefit dependence
rates than the rest of the population (Åslund, Forslund, &
Liljeberg, 2017; Riksrevisionen, 2015).
As in other policy areas, asylum policy was also in-
fluenced by the general workfarist reorientation of the
Swedish model. The refugee reception system was first
reformed in 1994 by giving municipalities the power to
offer newly-arrived asylum seekers the possibility of par-
ticipating in non-mandatory introductory programmes,
with the aim of assisting their socioeconomic integration
through individually-tailored introduction plans. A ma-
jor change occurred in December 2010 with the launch
of the so-called “Establishment Reform” (also known as
“Law on introduction activities for recently arrived im-
migrants”, or in Swedish: Lag om etableringsinsatser för
vissa nyanlända invandrare). The Establishment Reform
did not affect the voluntary nature of introductory pro-
grammes. Yet, participants becameentitled to a newben-
efit, the Establishment Allowance, which is more gener-
ous than the social assistance benefits received in the
case of non-participation. In reality, the Establishment
Reform indicated a shift towards a more duty-based and
sanction-orientated approach. In fact, claims for social as-
sistance can be rejected by the municipalities in cases of
participation refusal in the programmes, and the Estab-
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lishment Allowance can be reduced, or even withdrawn,
in cases of non-compliance to the individually-tailored
plan (Borevi, 2017, p. 277). The main aim of the Estab-
lishment Reform was to centralise and standardise the
implementation of such programmes by transferring the
responsibilities for their design and administration from
the municipalities to the state-controlled Public Employ-
ment Service (PES). Meanwhile, the PES was given the
possibility of contracting out the actual implementation
of the programmes to private actors, the so-called Estab-
lishment Pilots.
The decision to involve private actors in introductory
programmes for refugees was in line with the New Public
Management philosophy underpinning recent Swedish
public sector reforms. Since the early-1990s, public sec-
tor agencies have been increasingly called on to adopt
private sector practices and solutions in order to improve
their performance as well as responsiveness to the de-
mands of citizens who are treated as active consumers
capable of making conscious and informed choices re-
flecting their preferences (Hartman, 2011). In this re-
spect, “freedom of choice” was explicitly set out as a
pivotal policy objective of the reform in the govern-
ment proposition (Proposition 2009/10:60). Although
newcomers are virtually allowed to choose their own
Establishment Pilot, few of them are able to navigate
the unfamiliar system, primarily due to language barri-
ers. In this respect, the Establishment Reform has been
described as inspired by a “neoliberal” notion of empow-
erment, expecting that newcomers should take responsi-
bility for their own integration process, but without con-
sidering the structural barriers they face in Swedish soci-
ety (Fernandes, 2015, p. 258).
Another criticised feature of the reform is the
results-based remuneration system for the Establish-
ment Pilots (Sibbmark, Söderström, & Åslund, 2016).
A “registration-premium” (startersättning in Swedish)
encouraged the exchange of refugees among Establish-
ment Pilots through their re-enrolling in new individually-
tailored introductory programmes provided by other
subcontractors. Furthermore, the achievement of short-
term employment goals became more important than
that of longer-term social integration objectives because
the Establishment Pilots can receive a “speed-premium”
(snabbhetspremie in Swedish) upon rapid labour market
integration of their “clients”. Although the remuneration-
system implies compensation in the case of refugees’ en-
rolment in higher education, in practice they cannot af-
ford this option because of the high resettling and ac-
commodation costs in university cities (Pelling & Ben-
der, 2017).
The U-turn in asylum policy at the end of 2015
created additional pressures on some newly arrived
refugees to accelerate their entry into the Swedish
labour market. With the suspension of the previous asy-
lum policy, refugees who are not accepted under the
EU-quota system receive a three-year temporary resi-
dence permit that can be converted into a permanent
one only if they can prove that they are able to sup-
port themselves through paid work. This self-sufficiency
requirement is pressuring refugees with temporary per-
mits to take any job, regardless of their educational back-
ground and prior work expertise. They often enter the
Swedish labour market without having their qualifica-
tions recognised, as the validation procedure can take
several months, and even up to several years in the case
of high-skilled individuals (Riksrevisionen, 2015, p. 119).
The visible effect of the aforementioned policy
changes was a sudden increase in the share of refugees
registering to PES just after arriving in the country, albeit
there was no parallel improvement in the transition rate
to stable employment (Åslund et al., 2017, p. 125). Swe-
den is still marked by one of the highest gaps in employ-
ment rates between immigrants and natives acrossOECD
countries, even though the levels of labourmarket partic-
ipation are comparatively high for both groups (Riksrevi-
sionen, 2015, p. 40). Disaggregated data show that this
gap is due to the fact that immigration to Sweden is dom-
inated by refugees and their family members who often
face great difficulties in entering the labour market.
At the same time, refugees who manage to find em-
ployment are disproportionately concentrated in the less
favourable segments of the labour market and especially
in less qualified employment positions. This means that
the jobs refugees do are often not commensurate with
their skills, educational qualifications and prior working
experience in their country of origin. The latest OECDMi-
gration Outlook shows that Sweden has the fourth high-
est rate of over-qualification among immigrants in the
OECD, after those of Italy, Greece and Denmark (OECD,
2017, p. 68). Available data show that this problem es-
pecially concerns the recently arrived asylum seekers
and refugees. According to OECD figures, the share of
recent immigrants being more skilled or educated than
is needed to do their job increased by ten percentage
points between 2007–2008 and 2014–2015; i.e., from 30
to 40 percent of the total (OECD, 2017, p. 69).
4. Conclusions
Almost two years after the U-turn in asylum policy, the
predictions about the risk of a possible “system break-
down”, caused by the recent surge of refugee arrivals to
Sweden, appear to be falsified by the exceptionally pos-
itive trend in local government finance. The latest esti-
mates from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities
and Regions indicate that the various measures targeted
at refugees had the secondary effect of providing a posi-
tive fiscal stimulus to economic growth at the local level;
all themore unexpected according to the dominant polit-
ical narrative of “system breakdown”. In fact, 2016 was a
record year for Swedish local governments in terms of ag-
gregate budget surplus; the largest ever recorded in the
21st century (SKL, 2017a, p. 35). This budget surplus was
about 25 billion Swedish kronor (about 2.5 billion Euros)
in 2016, compared to 9.7 billion kronor (about 970 mil-
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lion Euros) in 2015, and the increase was exclusively due
to the extent of state support to municipalities receiving
asylum seekers and refugees.
Small municipalities, and in particular the rural ones
suffering from long-term demographic and economic de-
cline, are those that have benefited the most in terms
of central government’s per capita contribution (SKL,
2017a, p. 40). It is no surprise then, that what had been
anticipated to be a burden at the national level came
to be often represented as an opportunity for economic
growth at the municipal level. Refugee intake came to of-
ten be seen under a positive light by the local councillors
of municipalities which benefitted the most from cen-
tral government’s support, regardless of their party affil-
iation (Hansen, 2017b). In these municipalities, refugee
migration contributed directly to a reversal of population
decline, the increase in the number of school pupils in
schools that had been threatenedwith closure, as well as
a major boost in local consumption, thereby generating
further employment opportunities and revenue streams
for the local population.
Yet, central government’s support to refugee-
receiving municipalities is only temporary, and existing
measures will gradually be phased out before the long-
lasting and stable integration of refugees into the local
communities can create self-sustaining positive effects.
The phasing out of government support to municipali-
ties is the consequence of the more restrictive asylum
policy, which has also resulted in a general decline in
refugee acceptance rates. In the present situation, local
authorities are urged to find alternative financial sources
to keep their budgets balanced; a requirement that they
are legally bound to meet under the national financial
framework (SKL, 2017b).
An alternative strategy could have been to embark on
a more ambitious growth agenda based on “refugee Key-
nesianism” (Hansen, 2017a) by investing in policy mea-
sures that enable refugees to maximise their human cap-
ital, thus helping them to secure employment opportu-
nities commensurate with their skills and approaching
greater equality with natives. This would be a strategy
requiring considerable short- and medium-term public
investments, but yielding long-term beneficial dividends.
As discussed in previous pages, this strategy does not
seem to be compatible with the financial constraints
imposed by the institutional machinery of the Swedish
“consolidation state” (Streeck, 2014).
As we write these concluding remarks, there is an
emerging disagreement between the two main political
blocs concerning the issue of changing labour market en-
try conditions for refugees in order to enhance their em-
ployment possibilities. For the conservative party, this
would imply lowering entry-level wages in order to stim-
ulate the creation of low-skilled jobs explicitly targeted
at refugees. The Social Democratic Prime Minister Ste-
fan Löfven criticised the conservatives’ proposal for risk-
ing driving down wages across the labour market. At the
same time, however, he argued that the Swedish labour
market should not be adapted to the needs of recently
arrived refugees, but rather the latter should adapt them-
selves to the high-skill needs of the Swedish labour mar-
ket (Olsson & Tedesjö, 2017).
The question remains about the role the Swedish
welfare state should play in the “adaptation” process
of refugees. The current policy inherited by the previ-
ous right-wing government has proven to be ineffec-
tive, and in some circumstances may have facilitated
exploitative labour conditions for refugees, especially
those with temporary permits. Apparently, the alterna-
tive policy advocated by the current red-green govern-
ment would seek to combine lower entry-level wages
with new skill-enhancement and training measures in or-
der to match refugees with existing job vacancies in the
Swedish labour market. But will this policy be feasible
under the constraints dictated by the austerity regime
of the Swedish consolidation state? We leave this ques-
tion open, pending future political developments until
the next Swedish general elections in September 2018.
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